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COMMENTS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN VIRGINIA
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
The juvenile court, representing the parens patriae power of the
state, was created in order to remove juveniles from the stigmatizing
and punitive atmosphere of adult criminal courts.1 Divorced from this
atmosphere, the juvenile court, by administering individualized justice'
in an informal, civil-natured proceeding,3 could measure the juvenile's
social maladjustment and subject him to state supervision in such a
manner as to correct his delinquent attitude and lead him to a correct
life. Many forums, however, have found that the functioning juvenile
system inadequately promulgates the enlightened principles which led
to its creation.- Scholars have attacked the non-criminal label as an
ISee Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 109-110 (1909). See also
Nicholas, History, Philosophy, and Procedures of the Juvenile Court, 1 J. FAm. L.
151 (1961). However, a stigmatizing and punitive atmosphere is present in the juvenile
system. The founders escaped the brand of criminality only to find the brand of
delinquency just as damning. Virginia has attempted to remove these brands. VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-179 (Cum. Supp. 1968) forbids the use of the words "crime" or "conviction"
in referring to a juvenile court action. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 335, 342,
38 S.E. 2d 444, 447 (1946). By the enactment of VA. CODE ANN. S 16.1-158 (Cum.
Supp. 1968) Virginia also removed any procedural determination of delinquency. A
juvenile, under the statute, is adjudged under the court's jurisdiction and is therefore
subject to rehabilitative treatment. However, the effectiveness of avoiding stigma by
changing labels is questioned. Platt & Friedman. The Limits of Advocacy : Occupa-
tional Hazards in Juvenile Court, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1156, 1160 (1968).
Indeterminate sentencing and inadequate rehabilitative facilities continue the punitive
atmosphere the founders sought to escape. "Court adjudication and disposition of
offenders should no longer be viewed solely as a diagnosis and prescription for cure,
but frankly recognized as an authoritative court judgment expressing society's claim
to protection." PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE: TAsK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE REPORT]. Indeed, such an approach has been actively
adopted in the German Juvenile system. See Overland and Newhouse, Juvenile Criminal
Law in the Federal Republic of Germany and in England, 4 CAL. WEST. L. REv. 35,
36 (1968).2 See Shears, Legal Problems Peculiar to Children's Courts, 48 A.B.A.J. 719 (1962).
For a discussion of the important role of social reports in the administration of indi-
vidualized justice see Teitelbaum, The Use of Social Reports in Juvenile Court Adjudi-
cation, 7 J. FAM. L. 425 (1967).
3 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 281, 16 S.E. 2d 641, 644, cert. denied,
314 U.S. 690 (1941).
4 ld. at 279, 16 S.E. 2d at 643.
5 Legislative recognition of juvenile system inadequacies is exemplified by model
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insufficient justification for summary proceedings administered with
extensive judicial power, 6 and question the constitutional propriety
of denying juveniles procedural rights in exchange for unfulfilled
promises of rehabilitation.7
In In re Gault,8 the Supreme Court of the United States found the
disparity between the functioning juvenile system and its avowed
principles unacceptable. The failures of the system9 and the serious-
ness of an adjudication of delinquency led the Supreme Court to de-
mand greater formalities in juvenile proceedings involving possible
commitment to a state institution.10 This comment will consider the
effect of the Gault guarantee of counsel upon the administration of
juvenile justice in Virginia. Primary focus will be placed on Virginia's
statutory attempt to implement the Gault guarantee of counsel. 1
As a result of the Gault decision, four basic procedural rights are
statutory revision in several states. The following statutes are representative: N.Y.
FAMILY CT. ACT (McKinney 1963); CAL. WELF. & IN51eNS CODE (West Supp. 1967);
Iii. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1 to 708-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967). Congress has shown
its concern in the proposed Juvenile Delinquency Act, S. 1248, 90 Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). Executive interest is illustrated by the PRESmENT'S CoIvn'N ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMANiSTRATION OF JusncE, Tim CHALLENGE OF CRIME rN A FREE Socmrrv
(1967) [hereinafter cited as NAT'L CumxE Comm'N REPORT]. The most significant
judicial consideration of the juvenile system's inadequacies is In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
(1967). This decision is reflective of what Cox finds the most intensive criminal pro-
cedure reform in our country's history. A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT, at 74 (1968).
6Welch, Delinquency Proceedings-Fundamental Fairness for the Accused in a
Quasi-Criminal Forum, 50 MINN. L. REv. 653, 694 (1966).
7E.g., Glueck, Some "Unfinished Business" in the Management of Juvenile De-
linquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REv. 628-640 (1964). For a list of authorities who advocate
constitutional reforms see Platr & Friedman, supra note 1, at 1160 n. 22.
8 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9 E.g., TASK FORCE REPORT 7-9.
10Paulsen, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 SUPREME
COURT REVIEw 233, 241.
11 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173 (a) (Cum. Supp. 1968) provides that:
In any case in which a child or minor is within the purview of this law, or
subject to the jurisdiction of the court hereunder, except any offense for which
the maximum sentence does not include a sentence of confinement or a case
involving child custody, the court shall, if such child or minor appear for any
hearing without being represented by counsel, appoint an attorney at law to
represent him and provide such child or minor legal representation throughout
every stage of the proceeding against him.
The order of appointment of counsel shall be filed with and become a part
of the record of such proceeding. The attorney, so appointed, shall represent
the child or minor at any such hearing and at all stages of the proceeding until
relieved or replaced in the manner provided by law.
This comment will not consider the effect of this statute upon custody proceedings or
traffic violations where penalties are explicit and punitive in nature.
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guaranteed in the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile proceeding when
a determination of delinquency is being made, the foreseeable result
of which could be commitment to a state institution. 12 Of these safe-
guards, that of right to counsel is most fundamental for it attempts
to insure procedural regularity in the juvenile court." Although lack
of counsel in juvenile proceedings is not a denial of due process under
the Virginia constitution, 14 the Virginia legislature has guaranteed
counsel for juveniles in every procedural stage if confinement may re-
sult.15 This statutory guarantee is an extra-constitutional right under
Virginia law, but in so far as it incorporates the Gault situation, it
expresses a due process guarantee. Denial of counsel outside the Gault
situation, cannot be collaterally attacked,' but timely exception to
such a denial would be grounds for appeal.' 7 However, appeals are rare
in juvenile courts because of the cost involved and the general re-
luctance to challenge the court's paternal decree."
12 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967). These rights are notice of the charges, right to counsel,
right to confrontation and cross-examination, and privileges against self-incrimination.
Id. at 10.
13E.g., Skoler, The Right to Counsel and the Role of Counsel in Juvenile Court
Proceedings, 43 IND. L.J. 558 (1968).
14 Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 251, 156 S.E. 2d 874, 880 (1967). The Supreme
Court of Appeals found the parens patriae concept of non-counsel representation
adopted by all states, constitutionally adequate to satisfy the Virginia due process
clause. Such a position by the court in light of the Gault decision, seems unrealistic
and regressively inadequate. States throughout the country have exhibited a marked
awareness of the juvenile court system's deficiencies and, like Virginia, through statutory
reform have attempted to insure procedural guarantees, such as right to counsel,
as a stabilizing and reforming measure. See Skoler & Tenney, Attorney Representation
in Juvenile Court, 4 J. FAM. L. 77, 95-96 (1964).
15 It is within the discretion of the juvenile judge under VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-178
(Cum. Supp. 1968) to confine a juvenile for any offense (i.e., those specified in VA.
CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (1) (f), (g), (h), (i), (j)) that creates jurisdiction in the court
to consider the petition. It should be noted that traffic offenses and custody proceedings
are excluded from this discussion.
16 For a collateral attack to be available outside the Gault situation, there must be
a lack of jurisdiction. Cunningham v. Haynes, 204 Va. 851, 855, 134 S.E. 2d 271, 274
(1964). A deficiency that makes a decree void would also be sufficient. Hobson v.
Youell, 177 Va. 906, 916, 15 S.E. 2d 76, 80 (1941). Although VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173
(Cum. Supp. 1968) is mandatory in tone, it would not effect the power of the court
to hear the proceeding. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-158 (Cum. Supp. 1968). As representa-
tion by counsel is not a constitutionally guaranteed right in Virginia, denial would not
void the proceeding. Of course when denial of counsel falls within the scope of the
Gault decision, it would be a denial of due process and assailable by any means.
17 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-214 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
18 TASK FORCE REPORT 40. See also Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State
Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 799 (1966). Appellate review
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Gault, in part, uses "commitment to a state institution" as a measuring
stick to determine when counsel is required. The Virginia statute in-
corporates this standard by stipulating that when the maximum sen-
tence may be confinement, counsel is required.19 Yet this language
provides more than a mere guideline to be used by the juvenile court.
The literal effect of the statute is to require counsel in every juvenile
proceeding because it is always within a Virginia juvenile court's power
to confine a juvenile under its jurisdiction, or to commit him to a state
institution.20 Since confinement is a possibility, but rarely a reality2'
in every juvenile proceeding, the total effect of the Virginia statute
has been to create an unwarranted extension of Gault.
Extending the Virginia statute beyond the Gault standard has pro-
duced a result as unacceptable as the failure of the juvenile system to
transpose its founding principles into a functioning reality. Gault
emphasizes the procedural necessity of counsel where commitment may
result, and qualifies this as applicable only in a delinquency-determining
adjudicatory stage. Virginia has incorporated these qualifications in
its statute, but by correlating the right to counsel with the ever present
threat of confinement, counsel's presence is necessary in every stage
of every proceeding. Where confinement is a possibility, this expansion
of Gault is laudably prospective. But, where confinement is not a
practical alternative, counsel's presence is not essential to insure the
juvenile's due process rights. Although this end has been indirectly
achieved by effective use of waiver of counsel forms,22 prompt statu-
tory revision by the Virginia Legislature would more effectively re-
store judicial discretion in non-confinement proceedings. 23
can effectively reduce arbitrary and inconsistent official action. Handler, The Juvenile
Court and the Adversary System: Problem of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REv.
7, 44-45.
19 VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173 (a) (Gum. Supp. 1968) quoted, supra note 11.
20Jurisdiction in traffic violation and custody proceedings will not be considered in
this comment. Disregarding these two proceedings, the juvenile judge, vested with the
power conferred by VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-178 (Gum. Supp. 1968), can as a rehabilitative
alternative, confine any juvenile before him.
21 See Lemert, The Juvenile Court-Quest and Realities, TASK FORCE REPORT 91, 96.
22 Paulsen, Juvenile Court and The Legacy of '67, 43 IND. L.J. 527, 534-535 n. 35
(1968).
23 In any statutory revision it would be important to specify what will constitute
confinement. Certainly the juvenile's rights are restricted while he is on probation
or in a foster home for undetermined periods. Perhaps the line should be drawn at pre-
adjudicative disposition and adjudicative disposition that results in a warning or pro-
bation. See Skoler, supra note 13, at 563 n. 27.
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Where confinement is in fact a possibility, counsel's presence is
recognized as a procedural mechanism of control.24 The Supreme Court
of the United States recognized a juvenile's constitutional right to
. . . the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, to make
skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon the regularity of the pro-
ceeding and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and
submit it.25
It will be left for the juvenile judge to make this conceptually adverse
advocate an effective officer of the court, as well as a guardian of the
juvenile's rights and welfare.
A recent study of Chicago counsel service for juveniles26 illustrates
the frustration and lack of understanding among attorneys as to their
dual role in juvenile proceedings. The typical counselor was found
to be a small-fee lawyer who most often is pressured by the welfare
system into ignoring his adversary functions in order to reduce friction. 27
Such a counselor discovers that seldom is a case won on its merits, and
if a case is won on a technicality, he feels obligated to reprimand the
youth against further acts of misconduct.28
Active participation by attorneys in juvenile proceedings may create
inconveniences. Compliance with the Gault decision and Virginia
statutory counsel requirements will be expensive. But, this cost factor
might induce a more conscientious effort by juvenile authorities to
dispose of less severe offenses at the pre-adjudicative stage. 29 An advo-
cate's presence will place the judge in the awkward position of being
both judge and prosecutor. A full utilization of adversary representa-
tion may necessitate an attorney for the state to insure proper presen-
tation of the case and free the judge from advocate responsibilities.30
Educational programs must be instituted to develop a bar aware of the
juvenile court philosophy, and its dual role as an assisting and reforming
arm of the court."'
24 E.g., Welch, supra note 6, at 667-683; NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT 86-87.
25 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).
26 Platt & Friedman, supra note 1.
27 Id. at 1168.
2 8 Id. at 1182.
2 9 TASK FORcE REPoRTr 9-22.
30 Skoler, supra note 13, at 577.
31 Legal training could be provided in a number of ways. Continuing legal education
programs could educate the existing bar. Internship programs have been instituted in
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Procedural domestication will not dissipate the juvenile court's ability
to exercise the parens patriae power of the state. Indeed, procedural
informality has been found to instill in juvenile offenders a sense of
injustice over the seemingly challengeless authority vested in judges
and welfare officials. 32 Effective implementation of the Gault guarantees
by the juvenile judiciary can complement and reform the administration
of individualized justice. The Virginia counsel statute, despite its weak-
nesses, initiates the struggle to achieve this reformation.
H. M. B.
law schools. See Furlong, The Juvenile Court and The Lawyer, 3 J. FAM. L. 1, 33-44
(1963).
32 NATAL CRIME Comr&N REPORT 85.
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